← All quantitative finance open problems

Financial networks / Open question

Equilibrium selection in financial networks with defaults and fire sales

Explains when balance-sheet contagion and forced asset sales lead to different systemic outcomes from the same static network, improving the interpretation of stress tests.

OpenEditorially scopedFramework needs definitionCompiled 2026-11-09

Seed catalog · Showing the bundled record.

Problem statement

In a financial network with interbank liabilities, default losses and endogenous fire-sale prices, determine which static price-payment equilibrium is selected by an explicitly specified dynamic clearing and liquidation mechanism. Characterize its convergence and basins of attraction, and whether the selected equilibrium is stable under small liquidity shocks, asynchronous updates or vanishing adjustment frictions.

Assumptions and scope

  • Fix network liabilities and seniority, external assets, recovery/default-cost rules, liquidation constraints and the inverse-demand or price-impact map.
  • Choose a setting known to admit multiple static equilibria; specify initial conditions, information, timing and the adjustment dynamics that define selection.
  • State the order of long-time, small-noise and vanishing-friction limits when these are used, and allow for nonconvergence or mechanism-dependent limits.
  • Computing the greatest or least fixed point alone is not a prediction of which equilibrium a dynamic mechanism reaches.

What would settle it?

A selection and stability theorem for a specified network/adjustment class, identifying the limiting equilibrium and its basin, or counterexamples demonstrating persistent cycles or dependence on the mechanism and limit order.

Selected for a theoretical or computational target. A successful calibration or numerical benchmark alone does not establish the stated mathematical guarantee.

Status and evidence

Static existence and algorithms for greatest/least price-payment equilibria are established in integrated default-cost, fire-sale and cross-holding models. Dynamic clearing frameworks also have existence and uniqueness results under their own assumptions. The research question is the relation between specified dynamic mechanisms and multiple static equilibria; there is no mechanism-free universal selection rule asserted here.

Preliminary source check; not an expert-verified open status or an independent audit of proposed proofs. The compilation date is not a literature-review cutoff.

Sources and further reading

  1. Weber & Weske: The joint impact of bankruptcy costs, fire sales and cross-holdings on systemic risk in financial networks ↗partial progress · source checked 2026-11-09

    Scholarly abstract: existence of price-payment equilibria and greatest/least equilibrium algorithms.

    Static extremal equilibria do not by themselves resolve dynamic selection.

  2. Banerjee, Bernstein & Feinstein: Dynamic clearing and contagion in financial networks ↗partial progress · source checked 2026-11-09

    Scholarly abstract: continuous-time clearing driven by operating cash flows and comparison with static clearing.

    A specific dynamic framework; its uniqueness is not a universal selection result for all fire-sale models.